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I. Introduction
•

The most significant demographic trends in the United States reflect
the "greying" of our population. In 1900, 3.1 million Americans (4% of
1
the population) were over the age of sixty-five. By 1998, that figure had
2
increased to 34~4 million, and by 2010, the over-sixty-five population
3
will be 40.1 million, 13.3 percent of the nation. More than 70 million
4
Americans will join the ranks of the elderly in the next twenty years.
Moreover, the "old-old," those over eighty-five, are increasing even faster
than seniors as a whole. 5
Family law practice includes many points of intersection between traditional doctrine and the elderly. The practitioner often confronts the same
issues when representing older and younger clients, but the fortner present
special needs. This article surveys some of the challenges presented by
this increasing representation of the elderly and their families. The law in
these subject areas is conceptually complex and changes frequently. Often
expertise in allied topics bankruptcy, disability law, insurance, etc. is
required. The task is formidable, but legal services well perforn1ed bring
the incalculable reward of helping clients with disparate needs.

II. Economic Issues
A. Spousal Liability for Health & Institutional Care Costs
Today, more elderly persons are living long enough to experience
chronic illnesses and conditions, such as arthritis, heart disease, and senile
6
dementia. Large amounts of family resources are consumed by health
7
and long-tertn care costs in the last years of life. Despite the popular view
1. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, Profile of Older
Americans, available at http://www .aoa.gov/prof/Statistics/profile/profiles2002.asp [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION ON AGING] .
2. /d.
3. Susan Levine, Aging Baby Boomers Pose Challenge: Preparations Needed for Coming
Strain on Services, Census Reports Says, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1996, at A09.
4. Donna Jackel, TV Show, Call-in Offer Caregivers Help, DEMOC. & CHRON (Rochester
N.Y.), Oct. 9, 2002, at 4B, available at 2002 WL100997674.
5. See ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, supra note 1 (stating that population sixty-five years and
older projected to grow from 34.4 million to 70.1 million, while population eighty-five years
and older projected to grow from 4 million to 8.9 million).
6. "Older people accounted for 40% of all hospital stays and 49% of all days of care in hospitals in 1995." KIMBERLEY DAYTON, ET AL. , ELDER LAW: READINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS 12
(2d ed. 2003). In that year "[e]lder persons averaged more contacts with doctors . .. than did
persons under 65 ( 11.1 contacts vs. 5 contacts)." Id.
7. /d. at 7. Although 1.4 million or 4% "of the 65+ population lived in nursing homes in
1995, the percentage increased dramatically with age, ranging from 1 percent for persons 65-74
years to 5 percent for persons 75-84 years and 15 percent for persons 85+." ADMINISTRATION
ON AGING, supra note 1.
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that seniors' medical needs are provided by Medicare, it is estimated that
8
when expenses are totaled, Medicare pays less than 50%. A major financial issue for older clients is payment of these health-care costs.
English common law obligated husbands to support their wives fman9
cially in return for "services." Modern statutes and decisions have rewritten
this obligation in gender-neutral terms so that today both spouses have recip10
rocal support obligations. Under the venerable doctrine of "necessaries,"
if one spouse fails to supply the other with articles or services reasonably
appropriate for support, and a third party supplies these necessaries, the
11
nonpurchasing spouse is liable for their cost. The doctrine is applied to
12
both husbands and wives.
Often the spouse treated or served by providers doctors, hospitals,
nursing homes, etc. has insufficient resources to meet the debts incurred.
Delinquent accounts are turned over to collection agencies and when payment is not made, legal proceedings ensue against the nontreated spouse.
In this situation, statutes and court decisions in many states impose financial liability on the nontreated spouse under the necessaries doctrine.
13
Whether termed "family expense" laws or given some other title, this
14
legislation often makes spouses jointly and severally liable. Arizona goes
so far as to make it a crime for a married person with means not to provide
15
for his or her spouse's necessaries.
Many state courts also have provided relief for medical and institutional
16
providers of services under this doctrine. The debtor spouse is commonly
8. Lynn Etheredge, Three Streams, One River: A Coordinated Approach to Financing
Retirement, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 80, 82 (Jan.-Feb. 1999).
9. See Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 784 (1659) (husbands are bound by the common
law to provide for and maintain their wives).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Jun. LAw§ 412 (McKinney 1999) ("A married person is chargeable with
the support of his or her spouse .... "); VA. CODE ANN. § 55·31 (1999) ("The doctrine of necessaries as it existed in common law shall apply equally to both spouses .... ").
11. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,§ 7.3
at 444- 45 (2d ed. 1987).
12. Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1347 (N.H. 1995) (finding equal protection violation and extending the doctrine to both sexes); St. Francis Reg' 1 Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Kan. 1992) (holding that both spouses are liable for the necessary expenses incurred by either spouse and medical services are considered necessaries).
13. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/15(a)(l) (2003).
14. See, e.g., D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 46-601 (1998); HAw. REv. STAT.§ 572-24 (2003); LA. C1v.
CoDE ANN. art. 2372 (West 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. l9A, § 1652 (West 2003); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 1 (2003); MINN. STAT.§ 519.05 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 123.090 (2003);
N.Y. JuD. CT. Acrs LAW§ 412 (2003); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (West 2003); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.501 (Vernon 2003).
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 13-3610 1(2003).
16. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. of Nashua v. Rizzo, 676 A.2d 98 (N.H. 1996) (applying the
doctrine and allowing the provider to collect); Bethany Med. Ctr. v. N'yazi, 890 P.2d 349 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1995); St. Frances Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 123 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
See generally Husband & W1[e § 196, 41 AM. JuR. 2d (2002).
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primarily liable and the nondebtor spouse secondarily liable. In California,
if the debtor spouse has died, the living spouse is liable to the extent of his/
her share of the community property and the deceased spouse's property that
18
passes through intestacy or by will. The obligation to pay health-care costs
19
may exist, even though spouses are separated, if divorce papers were
20
filed at the time of treatment or the parties were later divorced. Some
21
states allow specific defenses.
A crushing economic burden may thus be placed upon the nontreated
or noninstitutionalized spouse. Almost half of American workers have no
22
pension coverage beyond Social Security, so assets are often few. Many
of these seniors lived through the Great Depression and times of great
hardships. Bankruptcy and large debt is often foreign and frightening to
them. Nevertheless, their health-related expenses force them to confront
unpleasant choices.
17. See, e.g., Porter Meml. Hosp. v. Wozniak, 680 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ind. App. 1997) (holding
that husband is potentially secondarily liable for the medical expenses of wife under doctrine of
necessaries); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1347 (N.H. 1995) (holding that
husband is secondarily liable for the necessary medical services provided to his wife under doctrine of necessaries, but only to extent that resources of wife are insufficient to satisfy debt); N.C.
Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 473 (N.C. 1987) (holding that doctrine of necessaries
is applicable to medical services provided to either spouse); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635
A.2d 1145, 1150 (R.I. 1994) (fmding that medical expenses are characterized as "necessaries"
within the spirit of the doctrine of necessaries); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326,
327 (Wis. 1982) (discussing that wife shares with her husband a limited legal duty of support of
the family, this includes liability for necessary medical expenses incurred by either spouse).
18. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 721 (West Supp. 2004).
19. See generally VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 2003); Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v.
Chisolm, 467 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1996); Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.
1993) (disallowing the separation defense); Mem'l Hosp. of Alamance County, Inc. v. Brown,
274 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
20. See Mercy Health Sys. Corp. v. Gauss, 639 N.W.2d 803 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (following the doctrine when the spouses were still married at the time services were provided, but subsequently divorced); Trident Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Evans, 454 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(court found spouse liable for debts since the couple was married at the time of the services);
Aker v. Fort Wayne Urology Corp., 562 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the death
of the husband did not excuse the wife from liability); St. Mary's Med. Ctr. v. Brody, 519 N.W.2d
326 (Wis. 1982) (disallowing defense of separation and holding forn1er wife liable for services
rendered to husband during marriage); Marshfield Clinic v. Disher, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982)
(following the doctrine that a wife is still liable for husband's debts even after he dies).
21. Montana, for example, provides an abandonment defense to its statutory duty. MoNT.
CoDE ANN. § 50-9-106 (1997); Balyeat Collection Prof[ v. Garland, 51 P.3d 1127, 1129 (Mont.
2002). In Mississippi a nondebtor spouse is not liable unless there was an express agreement to
pay. Govan v. Med. Credit Serv., 621 S.2d 928 (Miss. 1993).
22. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PREsENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYERSPONSORED DEFINED BENEAT PLANs (JCX-71-02, 2002), at 28 (stating that 56% of full-time privatesector employees have an employer-sponsored pension plan). There are significant variations in
pension plan coverage among racial groups. See Yung-Ping Chen & Thomas D. Leavitt, The
Widening Gap Between White and Minority Pension Coverage, Ptmuc PoucY & AGING 82 (2001).
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A 1999 study revealed that nearly half of bankruptcy filings listed med-

ical costs as the reason for the filing. Elderly and female-headed households
were more likely to have health-related bankruptcies than the rest of the
23
population. The same study found that 80% of those filing bankruptcies for
health reasons were unable to meet obligations even though they had some
form of medical insurance prior to the filing. Family law practitioners representing spouses in this situation should consider bankruptcy proceedings
24
under appropriate circumstances. Under chapter 7, nonexempt assets are
sold or used to repay all or a portion of the debts owed, and the debtor retains
rights to future income substantially clear of past debts. 25 Under chapter 13,
the debtor is required to make continuing payments, generally for three to
five years, but is allowed to keep most of the assets held at the time of filing. 26
A common bankruptcy problem for these clients, whether their debts
are related to medical costs or not, is that they often have substantial equity
in their home and risk losing it. Often seniors' mortgage payments are low
or their house may be completely paid for. In addition to providing economical shelter, the home is a source of comfort and security. When both
spouses are liable for the debt and there is equity beyond the statutory
exemptions in chapter 7, the trustee will sell the house.
In such situations, a chapter 13 bankruptcy can provide some relief, but
may also create problems. Assume, for example, the debtors have $70,000
of equity in their home because they have been paying on their mortgage for
a long time. In states such as Indiana, where debtors can protect only $15,000
of equity, they must .file a plan that ensures the creditors at least the lesser of
27
the nonexempt equity or 100% of the debt. Furthennore, these debtors may
not have sufficient total income to meet the bankruptcy obligation. To save
their homes, seniors may use Social Security or other pensions exempt in
bankruptcy, but income for nom1alliving expenses may now be insufficient.
A chapter 13 plan can continue for no more than five years.
Some creative solutions are worth considering for elderly clients in these
circumstances. First, debtors may remortgage their properties during the
23. Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence
From the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2001).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1-1330. Since only one bankruptcy may be filed in six years, this should be
used when other options are unavailable. Careful consideration must be given to how the existing assets are held, e.g., as tenancy by entirety, joint tenants with right of survivorship, etc./d.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 727 et seq. See generally Robyn L. Meadows, Bankruptcy Reform and the
Elderly: The Effect of Means-Testing on Older Debtors, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 227, 232 (2000).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (contents of plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (duration of plan).
27. 11 U.S.C. § l325(a)(4). This is known as the "Best Interest of Creditors" test. See, e.g.,
In re Jones, 301 B.R. 840 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003); In re Dewey, 237 B.R. 783 (B.A.P. lOth
Cir. 1999); In re Doman, 103 B.R. 61 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Chapman, 51 B.R. 663
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
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chapter 13 bankruptcy, using that e_q uity to produce a lower overall payment
and meeting the minimum dividend required by law for creditors. Second,
"reverse" mortgages enable debtors to borrow a lump sum from the home's
equity without the obligation to repay it. Creditors thus receive their
required dividend, and the debtors end up with either an existing mortgage
payment or no payment at all if their properties are paid up. The reverse
mortgage accumulates interest that is due upon the death of the debtor~

B. Intergenerational Support Duties
1. ADULT CHILD-PARENT

Although some elderly persons are wealthy, many others are not. In 1997,
28
one out of every six people over sixty...five, or 17%, was poor or near poor.
In 1999, thirty-two million, representing 34% of all older persons, reported
29
an income of less than $1 0,000; only 23% earned $25,000 or more. The
median income reported was $14,425. Despite income deprivation, older
households are less likely than younger households to receive public assis30
tance, food stamps, or have members covered by Medicaid.
The duty of parents in every state to support minor children financially is
well-known to family law practitioners. Far less known are statutes in thirty
states, which impose a duty on adult children to provide fmancial assistance
31
to their indigent parent. The fmancial need of the elderly parent, which triggers the duty, is usually phrased in general tenns, e.g., ''unable to maintain"
32
self. The obligation of the adult child is described in various ways: to pro34
33
vide "necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attention," "necessaries,"
35
36
"medical expenses; " or "burial expenses. " In some states, this duty is
.

28. U.S.

BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME

.

60-200

(Sept. 199_8).
29. About 3.4 million seniors, representing 10.5% of the population, were below official definitions of poverty in 1997. Another 2.1 million, or 6.4% of the elderly, were classified as "nearpoor." ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, A PROALE OF
OLDER AMERICANS (2000), available at http://www .aoa.gov/aoa/-stats/profile/profile2000.html
(hereinafter PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS]~
30. One-third or 31% of older renter households lived in publicly owned or subsidized housing in 1994, as compared to 14% for younger renters) additional indicia ofpoverty. PROALE ·Of
OLDER AMERICANS, supra note 29.
31. See Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy
Considerations, 10 BRKLN.J. LAw & PoL'Y 709 (1999) (Appendix A, listing all statutes).
32. State statutes utilizing such "unable to maintain" language include Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,. Pennsylvania,
and South Dakota.
33. States with this language include Indiana, Montana, and South Dakota.
34. States with "ne_c essaries" language include California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Mississippi, and Ohio.
35. States with "medical expenses" language include Nevada and Tennessee.
36. States with "burial expenses" language include Alaska; Indiana, Montana, and West Virginia.
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37

even extended to grandchildren. Because relatively few cases invoking
38
these statutes are reported in appellate court decisions and trial court cases
are rarely published, enforcement of these state statutes is difficult to gauge.
Economic support of the elderly is both a private and a public matter,
however. Less punitive and likely more successful policies would be federal and state laws and programs that encourage family members to support
elderly parents when feasible and reward them for doing so. Public subsidies
for a variety of needs- -·day care, respite care, caretaking tasks, housing to
enable multigenerational families to live together, promoting "teleworking"
by family caretakers would foster recognition that family and society
share responsibility for the aged.
2.

GRANDPARENT SUPPORT DUTIES

The Elizabethan poor laws required grandparents to support grandchil39
dren. These laws were transported to the colonies, but American common
40
law developed the opposite principle. Generally, grandparents were not
financially responsible for grandchildren. Child support proceedings were
41
to be undertaken against parents, but not grandparents. An exception
was typically made when the grandparent acted in place of parents on
42
behalf of the grandchild.
In 1996, the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program was abolished and replaced by the Personal Responsibility and
43
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The
37. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, and Utah.
38. These cases are collected in Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents,
86 MARQ. L. REv. 401, 422 n.ll7 (2002).
39. Laura W. Morgan, Family Law at 2000: Private and Public Support of the Family:
From Welfare State to Poor Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 705, 706-07 (1999). See generally Richard
Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under American Poor Laws, 54 MICH. L. REv. 497 (part 1),
54 MICH. L. REV. 607 (part IT) (1956).
40. See, e.g. , In re Gollahon, 707 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) ("Parent, not grandparents, are responsible for the children's custody, care, education, nurture, and support.");
Blaloch v. Blaloch, 559 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding that there is no common law requirement that grandparents provide support for their grandchildren).
41. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Miranda, 715 A.2d 680, 687 (Conn. 1998) ("general obligations
of parenthood entail the duty to supply necessary food, clothing and medical care.''); Dubroc v.
Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1980) (explaining that child support duty is imposed by fact
of maternity or paternity); Wilsey v. Wilsey, 831 P.2d 590,592 (Mont. 1992) (stating that child
support is a social and moral obligation of parents).
42. E.g., Ex parte Lipscomb, 660 So. 2d 986, 988 (Ala. 1994) (stating that a nonparent who
stands in loco parentis to a child may be held responsible for the child's support); Bennett v.
Bennett, 390 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that grandparents stood in loco parentis to grandchild when mother relinquished, in writing and before a notary, all claims, right
of custody, and parental control over her child, and expressly consented to the appointment of
child's grandmother as guardian).
43. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-93, 110 Stat. 2105.
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PRWORA amended 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) by adding ,p aragraph 18:
Enforcement of orders against paternal or maternal grandparents procedures
under which, at the state's option, any child support order enforced under this
part with respect to a child of minor parents, if the custodial parent of such child
is receiving assistance under the state program under part A of this subchapter,
shall be enforceable, jointly and severally, against the parents of the non-custodial parent .o f such child.44

Congress thus encouraged states receiving federal funds for child support
enforcement efforts to enact statutes making grandparents fiscally liable
for their grandchildren. Minors who have children have a duty to support
the child financially. Since these adolescents are often in school or otherwise unable to meet that obligation, the state may enforce the court order,
45
jointly and severally, against the grandparents. At least thirteen states have
enacted statutes providing for grandparent liability for child support. 46
Legislation holding grandparents financially responsible for the support
of their grandchildren in theory should motivate parents to teach their
teens about birth control, abstinence, and the dangers of pregnancy. 47
48
Grandparents may sue their grandchild's parents for reimbursement.

3. LONG-TERM CAREGIVING
Most older clients desire to remain at home or at least outside a nursing
49
home. Family support enables most of them to remain in the community
44. /d. at § 373.
45. See, e.g., Whitman v. Kiger, 533 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing that primary
responsibility for an infant born to unemancipated minors is placed on the minors' parents, even if
minors' parents do not assume such responsibility in writing); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50-13..4(b) (1999).
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-8l0(A) (West 2000); IDAHO CODE§ 32-706(4) (Michie 1996
& Supp. 2000); 305 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-10 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); Mo. CoDE ANN.
FAM. LAW § 5-203(c) (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 454.400(2)(16) (West Supp. 2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 167:3-a (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50-l3.4(b) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 31 09.19(B)(l) (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws 15-5-16.2(g) (1996 & Supp. 1999);
S.C. CooE ANN. § 20-7-936 (West Supp. 1999); S.D. CoOIAED LAWS § 25-5-18.2 (Michie
1999); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 49.90(l)(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 42-2103(e) (Michie 1999). See generally Laura W. Morgan, Fork It Over, Granny: The Child
Support Obligations of Grandparents, 11 (7) DIVORCE LmG. 129 (July 1999).
47. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
supra note 43, at§§ 101(3) ("Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral
to successful child rearing and the well-being of children;') & 101(10). Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (" ... it
is the sense of Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reductions in out-ofwedlock birth are very important Government interests ...").
48. See, e.g., Stiefelmeyer v. Stiefelmeyer, 485 So. 2d 729,730 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (holding that grandmother who sought child support modification against father of child prevailed by
showing significant change in circumstances that affect the welfare of the child).
49. A survey done by the American Association of Retired Persons reports that 85 o/o of the
respondents prefer to remain in their own homes if the need for care arises. JOHN MIGLIACCIO &
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rather than being institutionalized.5° An estimated twenty-two million house51
holds currently provide care for an older or disabled relative; approxi2
mately two-thirds of those providing care for elders are employed. 5 More
53
than 80% of all care provided to older persons is provided by family
members or other volunteer caregivers_in the home, a fact that has important
54
implications regarding gender-related roles in American society. Typically
women find themselves bearing the multiple responsibilities of rearing
children, working for income outside the home, and providing care for aging
55
family members. This often results in devastating consequences for the
female caregiver, including lost employment opportunities, fmancial strain,
6
and emotional stress. 5 Indeed, one of the reasons elderly women are more
likely to be in poverty than are their male cohorts is that their pension benefits and assets from employment have been decreased by years out of the
workforce caring for family members.
Working caregivers incur "significant losses in career development,
salary, and retirement income, and substantial out-of-pocket expenses as
57
a result of their caregiying obligations." The average lifetime loss of
wealth wages, private pension, and Social Security benefits experienced
E. CUTLER, CARING TODAY, PLANNING FOR TOMORROW 14 (1999) available at http://www.
caregi ving.org/nacguide. pdf.
NEAL

50~

MARLA BERG-WEGER, CARING FOR ELDERLY PARENTS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

(Stuart Bruchey ed. 1996).
51. Mary Beth Franklin, On-The-Job Aid for Caregivers, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FIN. MAG.,
August 1, 2001, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/ml318/8_55n6577547/pl/
article.jhtml.
52. Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a National Family
Policy and Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEM. 1, 6 (2002) (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Futurework: Trends & Challenges for Work in the 2ls't Century 28, 33 (1999).
53. Although the care needed is, of course, individualized, the vast majority is assistance
with activities of daily living such as bathing, dressing, housecleaning, cooking~ transportation,
and the like.
54. BERG-WEGER, supra note 50, at 3.
STRESS AND CHOICE 10

55. WOMEN AND AGING: BEARING THE BURDEN OF LONG-.'TERM CARE: JOINT HEARING BEFORE
THE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING & THE SUBCOMM., ON AGING OF THE COMM. ON HEALTH,
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS IN THE U.S., 107TH CONG. 22 (2002), available at

http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate22shl07.html. See, e-.g., ELAINE M. BRODY,
WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE: THEIR PARENT-CARE YEARS 29 (2003). See also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD,
THE SECOND SHIFf

(1989).

56. As one commentator explains: "The most severe impact of caring for a dependent adult
appears to be that it is totally monopolizing and without rest, twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week,, 365 days a year •. ., There is gradually isolation ....of the main care giver." Nancy
Guber1nan, The Family, Women and Caring: Who Cares for the Careers?; 17 RESOURCES FOR
FEMINISTS RES. 37, 39 (1988). See also THE METLIFE JUGGLING Acr STUDY: BALANCING
CAREGIVING WITii WORK AND THE COSTS INVOLVED (November 1999) at http:// www.caregiving.org/JugglingStudy.pdf (estimating 10% of all family caregivers left the- paid workforce
entirely) [hereinafter JuGGLING STUDY}. See generally BERG-WEGER, supra note 50.
57. JUGGLING STUDY, supra note 56, at 3.
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by caregivers is estimated to be $659,139. Ten percent of caregivers
report leaving the workforce completely, 11% take leaves of absence from
their employment, and 7% reduce their hours from full-time to part-time or
59
take a less demanding job. The economic value of the services provided
by these family members would be $200 billion per year if provided by
60
61
professionals. The average duration of caregiving is four and a half years;
10% provided care for ten years or more. Moreover, these caregivers often
62
spend their own money providing assistance to elderly relatives.
Family support enables 95% of seniors to remain in the community
63
instead of an institutional placement. Another advantage of such informal caregiving is the increased autonomy of the aging family member.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the perception of personal control
plays a critical role in an individual's long-tertn physical and emotional
64
health. Even relatively simple decision making, such as choice of food
65
and activity, leads to improved quality of life.
Given the prevalence and importance of this nonprofessional care, family
members often require infortnation and counseling from lawyers regarding
legal rights available to them. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) provides many employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid,
job-protected leave per year to care for a newborn child or immediate
66
family member (spouse, child, or parent) with a serious health condition.
Employees taking an FMI.~A leave are entitled to be restored to their original
position or to a similar position with equivalent "benefits, pay and other
67
terms and conditions of employment." The Act helps employees balance
work and family responsibilities but its provisions are quite restrictive.
68
Numerous exceptions leave many employees uncovered. Leave from the
job for care of nondesignated relatives, e.g., grandparent, parent-in-law, etc.,
58. /d. at 6.
59. THE METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYER COSTS FOR WORKING CAREGIVERS I (1997) available
at http://www .caregiving.org/metlife.pdf.
60. THE METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYED CAREGIVERS: DOES LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE
MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 1 (2001) available at http://www.caregiving.org/LTC%20study%20fmal.pdf.
61. The study also found that 21% have provided care for five to nine years, and 1Oo/o have provided care for 10 years or more. FAMILY CAREGIVING IN THE U.S.: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 12 (1997) available at http://www .caregiving.org/finalreport.pdf.
62. Those who actually record expenses estimate that they spend $171.00 per month on such
caregiving. /d. at 24.
63. BERG-WEGER, supra note 50, at 10.
64. Brian F. Hofland, Autonomy in Long-Term Care: Background Issues and a
Programmatic Response, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 3, 5-6 (1988); Judith Rodin, Aging and Health:
Effects of the Sense of Control, 233 SciENCE 1271 ( 1986).
65. /d.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2000).
67. /d. at§ 2614(a)(l)(A)(B).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(1) (FMLA applies only to employers with ftfty or more employees).
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is not protected. Since a maximum of only twelve workweeks is allowed,
the leave usually cannot meet the long-tertn care needs of most elderly
and/or disabled persons.
The critical deficiency of the FMLA, however, is that even middle-class
caregivers cannot survive or maintain their standards of living without pay.
A Department of Labor survey in 2000 indicated about three quarters of
those who needed to take leave to provide care for relatives were unable
69
to do so because they could not afford to go without pay. Many were
70
also afraid a leave would have a negative impact on their careers. An
alternative to the FMLA is employer-provided assistance to family caregivers, including employer-paid consultation and referral programs, and
71
employee-paid Iong-ter1n-care-insurance plans. Only a minority of
employers are this family-friendly.
Because the FMLA does not preempt state laws that provide better
family leave benefits, practitioners should investigate rights under individual state statutes, which provide more realistic assistance to caregivers
and the elderly. Hawaii, for example, at the discretion of the employee,
allows the use of accumulated sick leave in addition to unpaid leave to
72
care for family members. Washington has recently adopted a new statute
allowing workers to use paid sick leave, personal days, and vacation time
73
to care for family members. The most progressive step, effective July
2004, was taken by California in expanding the state disability insurance
program to allow employees to receive half their salary for up to six
74
weeks in order to take time off to care for a child or sick relative. But
even these state initiatives are minor in comparison to the problem.
Very few public sources of monetary compensation are available to family caregivers. Federal Medicare programs make almost no provision for the
long-tertn custodial care needed by the elderly and reimburse few services
75
in the home, both glaring deficiencies. Our clients fare no better under
69. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., U.S. 0Ep'T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES
AND EMPLOYERS: THE fAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, UPDATE 2-16, TABLE 2.17:
REASONS FOR NOT TAKING LEAVE 1995 & 2000 SURVEYS (2001) available at http://wWw.
dol.gov/asp/fmla/chapter2.pdf. [hereinafter, FMLA SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE] (77.6% of leaveneeders could not afford to take leave).
70. /d. (42.8o/o of leave-needers thought job advancement might be hurt, 27.8% did not want
to lose seniority, 31.9% thought their job might be lost).
71. Robert E. O'Toole, Integrating Contributory Elder-Care Benefits with Voluntary LongTerm Care Insurance Programs, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J., Dec. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL
15846972.
72. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN§ 398-4 (2002). See also 2003 CoNN. Acrs 213 (REG. SESs.).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 49.12.270 (West 2003).
74. S.B. 1661, 2002 LEG., 2001-02 SESs. (Cal. 2002). The maximum payout is $728.00 per week.
75. Medicare will finance skilled licensed nursing and therapy services, but these are typically not provided by relatives. MIGLIACCO & CUTLER, supra note 49, at 14. NATHAN L LINSK,
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state-administered Medicaid. First, there are stringent fmancial eligibility
guidelines; state funding is thus unavailable for many middle-class clients,
at least without considerable time for drafting and executing a sophisticated
Medicaid planning strategy. Second, like Medicare, Medicaid provides
little support for home healthcare. Payment to relatives is almost impossi76
ble because of the very restrictive definition of "personal care services"
77
and the bias toward funding institutional care. A few states have initiated
programs to compensate caregivers providing services to the elderly or
disabled in their homes. Florida and Minnesota provide direct funding to
78
such caregivers. Arizona allows taxpayers who provide in-home care for
79
an elderly parent a $10,000 exemption on the caregiver's state income tax.
An alternative to public funding is private long-tertn-care insurance,
although the cost of premiums often deters purchase. Long-tertn-care
insurance policies require intense study and analysis by the lawyer who
must be able to communicate complex provisions to the lay client..
Important choices must be made regarding benefits per day, benefit period,
home-care coverage, and many other topics. Often, the cost of insuring
both the husband and wife is not feasible.
Another alternative is for the dependent senior to compensate the family
caregiver. In most situations there will be a natural disinclination by the
caregiver to ask for compensation directly. Moreover, the dependent senior
ET AL., COMPENSATION OF FAMILY CARE FOR THE ELDERLY, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN AN AGING

64, 74 (Rosalie Kane & Joan D. Penrod, eds, 1995).
76. Medicaid regulations provide that "personal care services" are:
[S]ervices furnished to an individual who is not an inpatient or resident of a hospital,
nursing facility, intennediate care facility for the mentally retarded, or institution for
mental disease that are: (1) Authorized for the individual by a physician in accordance
with a plan of treatment or (at the option of the State) otheiWise authorized for the individual in accordance with a service plan approved by the State; (2) Provided by an individual who is qualified to provide such services and who is not a member of the individual's family; and (3) Furnished in a home, and at the State's option, in another location.
42 C.P.R. § 440.167(a) (200 1) (emphasis added).
77. Craig S. Meuser, Symposium: Long-Term Care for the Elderly: Why Government and
Business Should Take a Closer Look at Adult Day Care, 1 QuiNNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 23941 (1997) (discussing the disconnect between health care needs and Medicaid funding rules).
The nature of illness in the U.S. has now shifted from a preponderance of acute care illnesses
to a preponderance of chronic ailments and conditions. In fact, treatment of chronic conditions is
the fastest growing and highest cost segment of the health care system. Nevenheless, the Medicaid
program funds nursing home care much more than community alternatives like adult day care....
See also William G. Weissert et al., Cost Savings from Home and Community-Based
Services: Arizona's Capitated Medicaid Long·Term Care Program, 22 J. HEALTH PoL'Y & LAW
1329 ( 1997) (detailing substantial Medicaid savings achieved by promoting extensive home and
community-based care services as an alternative to institutional care).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.5601 (2003). Home Care for the Elderly Act, and implementing
regulations, 58 FLA. ADMIN. CODE. 58 H-1.002-04; MINN. STAT. S 256B.51 ( 1-3) (2003).
79. ARiz. REv. STAT.§ 43-1023(c) (2003).
SoCIETY
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may not have disposable income available to pay the relative. An option is
to allocate a share of the senior's estate to the caregiver. Although contracts
to will property in exchange for services are valid, probate codes often
require express reference in the will to the contract and extrinsic evidence
proving its tenns. 80 Typically, services are provided without written contract,
81
which may leave the caregiver without remedy after death of the senior.
The family law practitioner may play an important role in this situation. The
attorney must ensure there is no overreaching, which in some cases may
amount to financial exploitation.
Careful legal counseling and drafting is required because a minefield of
precedent and interrelated doctrines confront the caregiver. Courts in most
states presume that services provided by family members have been ren82
83
dered without expectation of payment if there is no express contract.
Even worse, the values that motivate caregiving family members and
others love, intimacy, nurturing may actually disadvantage them later.
"Courts frequently translate acts of care into evidence that the one-caring
unduly influenced the cared-for, or, worse yet, courts use caring acts to
84
support a presumption of undue influence."
In addition, procedural stumbling blocks abound. Often an estate
claimant must demonstrate by "clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence" that an express or implied agreement existed to compensate the
85
caregiver for services rendered. Failure to assert a claim until after the
80. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-514 (amended 1997).
81. See, e.g., Kohler v. Armstrong, 758 P.2d 407 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); In re Estate of Jesmer
v. Rohlev, 609 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Estate of Rollins, 645 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995); In re Estate of Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000); Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa.
107 ( 1862); Hall v. Finch, 29 Wis. 278 ( 1871 ).
82. See, e.g., Matter of Estate of Wilson, 579 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (App. Div. 1991) (citing In
re Adams Estate, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849 (App. Div. 1956); In re Schultz' Estate, 188 N.Y.S.2d 144
(Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Basten's Estate, 126 N. Y.S.2d 459 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
83. See, e.g., In re Clark's Estate, 267 NW. 273, 275 (Wis. 1936) "settled presumption that
services rendered by "near" relatives by blood or marriage [who] reside together as one common family ... [are] intended as mutual acts of kindness done or furnished gratuitously." /d.
(quoting In re Estate of Goltz, 238 N.W. 374, 376 (Wis. 1931 )). See generally Jonathan S.
Henes, Compensating Caregiving Relatives: Abandoning the Family Member Rule in Contracts,
17 CARDOZO L. REv. 715 (1996). See also Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 17, 18-20
(Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the contractual claim of a spouse who, in exchange for her husband's
oral promise to devise property to her, provided round-the-clock nursing care for her husband
who wanted to live at home rather than in a nursing home after his stroke).
84. Trent J. Thumley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the Foundation of
Undue Influence, ?liND. L. J. 513,514 (1996). See, e.g., 52 Estate of Beal, 796 P.2d 150, 152
(Okla. 1989) (provision of services was "irresistible evidence ... [of] undue influence").
85. Fahringer v. Estate of Strine, 216 A. 2d 82, 85 (Pa. 1966) (" [T]raditionally the courts
have been reluctant to give recognition to such contracts and have viewed claims based on such
contracts with misgivings and suspicion."). See also Eggers v. Rittscher, 529 N.W.2d 741, 744
(Neb. 1995) ("We regard with grave suspicion any claim of an oral contract to convey property
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decedent has died often weighs against the family caregiver. Theoretically,
cohabiting but unmarried couples would have a better chance for compensation since the presumption that services provided by family members
were rendered gratuitously would not be applicable. But courts have
86
blocked "family-like" cohabitants from recovering as well.
At least one state has enacted a statute that specifically allows a family
member to make a claim against the estate of the decedent without an
express contract if statutory requirements are met. In Illinois, a specified
family member spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of a disabled
person who "dedicates himself ... to the care of the disabled person by
living [with] and personally caring for [him/her] for at least three years ...
87
[is] entitled to a claim against the estate. Claims may be made on the basis
of lost employment or lifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress experienced as a result of personally caring for the disabled person. The claim
is based on the nature and extent of the person's disability. 88 The statute
has limitations; by explicitly naming specific close relatives as potential
claimants, others, e.g., nieces, nephews, grandchildren, etc., are excluded.
Nor is there any statutory definition of "disability," which would trigger
eligibility for compensation. Despite these limitations, the statue is a positive
response to the all-too-common situation of relatives sacrificing portions of
their lives in caregiving roles without an express contract for compensation.
In the absence of a will, state intestate succession laws provide for property to pass to a hierarchy of relatives, usually defined by blood, marriage
89
or adoption. These relatives inherit regardless of their conduct or their
actual relationship to the decedent. This remains true even if the relative
90
refused to care for, or even mistreated, the decedent. This extreme situation
at death."); Thompson v. Henderson, 591 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that oral
contracts to devise "are regarded with suspicion" and that "[t]he standard of proof in such cases
is not 'a preponderance of the evidence' but rather, one of 'high probability' ")(citation omitted).
Dead man's statutes have posed particular problems for contracts to devise. See, e.g., Farah v.
Stout, 684 A.2d 471, 474-77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
86. See Estate of Dodson, 878 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Women have not been
allowed to recover for the value of services rendered where there had been no provision in the
deceased's will, which provided for her. "(U]nlawful sexual intercourse is not considered consideration, and a contract based upon such a relationship will not be enforced." JoHN T.
GAUBATZ ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 207 (1993). But see
Estate of Zent, 459 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1990) (surviving cohabiter had claim in quantum merit
against estate for value of services rendered in expectation of compensation). For an extended
discussion of the family services presumption and its applicability to nonrelated cohabitants as
well as relatives, see In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 704-05 (Wis. 1980).
87. 755 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1.1.
88. E.g., 100% disability allows a $100,000 claim, down to 25% disability, $25,000./d.
89. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR., & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES§ 2.1
at 42 (2d ed. 2001).
90. Some jurisdictions disqualify spouses who abandoned the decedent, however. See, e.g.,
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presents practitioners opportunities for law refortn. The law should deny
benefits to those whose behavior makes them "unworthy heirs" and should
91
encourage caregiving within the family and society at large. Most of the
abuse of the elderly is perpetrated by close relatives; 90% of abusers are
family members, and two-thirds are the victim's adult children or spouses
92
of those children. Where relatives have not provided support and care or
have abused their parents, inheritance rights should be denied because of
93
their conduct. Moreover, those who have assumed and carried out care
responsibilities should be rewarded. This would add a financial incentive
encouraging care of the elderly.
California has moved in this direction, barring persons found guilty of
elder abuse and neglect by clear and convincing evidence from inheriting
94
from their deceased victims. The abuser is deemed to have died before
5
the victim and thus unable to inherit.? The statute also bars persons from
inheriting who have falsely imprisoned, endangered health, stolen property
96
or caused pain or mental suffering to the testator.
4.

PRENUPTIAL

& COHABITANT AGREEMENTS

A variety of legal and nonlegal issues are presented when a client,
whose previous marriage has ended in death or divorce, establishes a new
relationship. Often these clients are considering marriage to the new partner,
and the lawyer is asked to create a prenuptial agreement. The enforceability
97
of these contracts varies from state to state. The Unifottn Premarital
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (excluding a spouse who "voluntarily
leaves his or her spouse"). A few states also bar parents who abandoned or refused to support
their children. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRusTs LAW§ 4-1.4 (McKinney 1998) (disqualifying a parent who failed or refused to provide for a minor child). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) (1999) (barring a "parent
who has refused to acknowledge or has abandoned his or her child, or a person whose parental
rights have been tenninated").
91. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257,259-61,265-73 (1994) (criticizing statutes that allow "deadbeat dads" to inherit from their children); Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family
Property: A Proposal for Reform, I 3 LAw & INEQUALITY 401, 439 ( 1995) (proposing a family
violence statute "to deny abusers any [inheritance] benefits from those they abused"); AnneMarie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We Need to Go,
27 IND. L. REV. 517, 524-41 (I 994) (discussing refonn of intestate succession laws to prevent
inheritance by parents who abandoned or failed to support their children).
92. See National Center on Elder Abuse, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Pt 5,
Conclusions, available at http://www .aoa.gov/eldfam/Elder_Rights/Eider_Abuse/ABuseReport_
Full.pdf (September 1998).
93. See generally Seymour Moskowitz, Golden Age in the Golden State, Contemporary
Legal Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 36 LoY. (LA) L. REv. 589, 652-56 (2003).
94. CAL. PRos. CODE § 259 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). See also Moskowitz, supra note 93.
95. /d.
96. /d. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 236, 368 (WEST 1999 & SuPP. 2002).
97. See generally AMERICAN BAR Assoc. AITACKING AND DEFENDING MARITAL AGREEMENTS
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Agreement has been adopted in more than half of the states and almost
all of the remainder have rules governing these contracts .
The needs of older clients contemplating marriage may differ dramatically from those of younger clients.99 Hostility and suspicion, for example,
may be present between the elderly future stepparent and the adult stepchildren due to fears concerning the statutorily mandated division of the
estate after the death of the parent. If the parent(s) wishes to ensure that
property passes to later generations, the prenuptial agreement must list and
characterize this property and provide that these assets shall pass as provided in the will or the agreement itself. Children from previous marriages
should be specifically acknowledged, and the agreement should provide that
the spouse may transfer all or part of these separate assets to those children.
Other legal issues of elderly clients planning to marry need to be
addressed; e.g., domicile, waiver of rights to retirement benefits, obligations
to children of prior marriages, tax considerations, and the marital residence.100 The family home may be a particularly sensitive issue because
children or grandchildren may have anticipated living in it or selling it
once the parent dies. The premarital agreement in these cases should specify
whether the surviving spouse may continue to live in the home or dispose of
it. Additionally, if one spouse is forfeiting rights as a result of the marriage,
the loss can be recognized in the contract and the spouse compensated.
Remarriage of a senior citizen might result in a number of negative fmancial consequences, e.g., loss of alimony from a fonner spouse or a prior
101
102
prenuptial agreement, tertnination of benefits from a trust or will, or
103
loss of Social Security benefits drawn on the record of a prior spouse. A
well-drafted premarital agreement should resolve these matters.
Cohabitation has emerged as an important and rapidly increasing new
family fonn in the United States. Approximately 7% of the nation's couples
104
are in now-unmarried committed relationships. These relationships live
in the "shadow of the law" and often have more legal needs than traditional
ones. State-granted benefits and rules available to married couples in the
areas of taxation, inheritance, divorce, employment and privacy rights,
.

.

8.02 (2001); Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements
and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L~ &
..
FEMINISM 229 (1994).
98. UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr, 98 U.L.A. 369 (1987 & Supp. 1999).
99. See generally Randall Gingiss, Second Marriage Considerations for the Elderly, 45
S.D.L. REv. 469 (2000).
I 00. /d. at 469-90 (de_a ling with these issues in depth).
I 01. ld. at 490.
102. /d. at 477-78.
103. /d. at 469.
104. See ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES, P. 20-484, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS, March 1994 Xiii (1996).
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etc., must be established for unmarried elder couples through the use of
advance planning documents and contracts. Decisions may include whether
to combine or to keep property separate, treatment of pre-existing or lateracquired debt, daily living issues such as division of household expenses or
housework, plans for children, and who will take care of pets. The attorney may encounter complex situations involving elders who do not have
a life-partner but who want to treat friends as family in their legal plans.

III. Health-Care Decision Making
A substantial body of case law has been developed over the past three
decades involving medical decision makin,g concerning denial or termination of life-sustaining medical treatment. Competent patients are almost
105
universally given the right to make end-of-life decisions. Both the U.S.
Supreme Court and state courts have held this right does not end if the
106
patient is no longer competent. A frequent source of conflict; however,
is the dilemma posed by patients without current decision-making capacity who have not expressed their intent in advance or who have provided
conflicting or ambiguous directions. This difficulty would be obviated in
many cases by adherence to statutes that per1nit individuals, while they
are competent, to execute an advance directive regardin-g their future
107
treatment wishes.
108
Despite education campaigns and a federal statute requiring health-care
109
facilities to advise patients of their right to execute advance directives,
studies consistently report that the number of individuals executing such
110
documents is between 5% and 25% of the adult population. The reasons
include procrastination, discomfort at confronting death, fear that such
105. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 720,722-23 (1997).
106. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990);
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685-86 (Ariz. 1987); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (Ct. App. 1988); In re Tavel; 661 A.2d 1061, 1068 (Del. 1995); In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698,
709-10 (Ky. 1993); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 756 (Md. 1992); Guardianship of Doe, 583
N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 409 (Mich. 1995); In re Jobes;
529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976); In re Fiori, 673
A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445,449 (Wash. 1987); In re
Guardianship of L.W.; 482 N.W.2d 60, 67 (Wis. l992).
107. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 895 n. 9 ( 1997) (listing advance directive statutes of states).
I 08. See, e.g., Letter from Compassion in Dying Federation to Health Care Financing
Administration (Dec. 16, 1995) available at http://www .compassionindying.org/pain/
HCFAletter.html.
109. Patients Self·Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(Q).
110. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON HEALTif, COMMITI'EE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PATIENT SELF-DEfERMINATION Acr: PROVIDERS
EFFECI'IVENESS UNCERTAIN,

OFFER INFORMATION ON AovANCE DIRECI"IVES BUT

GAOIHEHS-95-135;

AT 9

(Aug. 1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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decisions may allow others to harm them, concern over legal costs, etc.
Family law practitioners may assume they need not discuss such a document(s) with clients because physicians will talk to their patients elderly or
not about the appropriateness and efficacy of advance directives. Available
112
evidence indicates most doctors do not have these conversations.
When the patient has no advance directive, most states have statutes that
provide for surrogate decision making for the patient. Most of these statutes
are hierarchic in form, providing for successive levels of decision makers.
Typical is the Florida statute that defines the hierarchy as a judicially
appointed guardian, spouse, majority of adult children, parents, majority
113
of adult siblings, etc. Nonrelated persons are rarely granted a voice in
this process. Cohabitants whether heterosexual, gay or lesbian are often
affected. Patients in these circumstances may well fmd medical decisions
made by persons with whom they have had little recent contact or with
whom they have had strong disagreements. Cohabitation agreements for
elderly couples should be supplemented with springing durable...;power-ofattorney and health-care-power-of-attorney documents, allowing partners
to make medical decisions for one another when and if needed.
Another dilenuna arising from the lack of an advance directive emerges
when relatives are in conflict over the appropriate decision. The resulting
bitterness may produce litigation precisely at the time when family members are psychologically, emotionally, and fiscally least able to deal with
the pressures of court proceedings. A cautionary tale is contained in the
recent much-publicized Schiavo case. On February 25, 1990, Theresa
Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest. She has been in a persistent vegetative
state for the past fourteen years. In 1998, her husband/guardian, petitioned
a Florida court to withdraw artificial life support. Mrs. Schiavo's parents
objected to the discontinuation, contesting what Mrs. Schiavo's medical
condition was and what her wishes would have been. By now, the sixth
year of litigation, there have been several trials, thirteen applications for
appellate review, countless hearings on motions and petitions, three federal
111. David Doukas; Advance Directives in Patient Care: If You Ask, They Will Tell You, 59
AM~ FAM. PHvs. 530, 530 (1999); Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care
----+tA Case for Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 889, 891 (1991); Greg A. Sachs et al.,
Empowerment of the Older Patient? A Randomized, Controlled Trial to Increase Discussion
and Use of Advance Directives, 40 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'v 269, 272 (1992).
112. Even where advance directives have been created, however, studies report.a large percentage of validly executed documents are not honored by physicians. See R. Sean Morrison et
al., Physician Reluctance to Discuss Advance Directives: An Empiric Investigation of Potential
Barriers, 154 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2311, 2315 (1994). See also Jo-Anne Herina
Jeffreys, Advance Directives: Are They Worth the Paper They're Written On?, 190 N.J. LAW
17, 17 (Apr. 1998).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 765.401 (2003).
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district court suits, several appellate court decisions, a state statute and
executive order, and the issuance of a gubernatorial stay to prevent the
4
withholding of nutrition and hydration from Ms. Schiavo. u The recitation
of this extraordinary litigation history should convince every family law
practitioner to ensure that clients make their wishes known in a legally
binding way and that such decisions are promptly carried out. Schiavo is
just one of the reported cases reflecting disagreement between family
115
members about end-of-life decision making.
Although as yet adopted by only a few states, the Uniform Health Care
116
Decisions Act has the potential to improve the legal situation. The act
simplifies and facilitates the· completion of advance directives but also
117
provides default procedures in the absence of an advance directive. It
118
allows individuals to name a surrogate decision maker in a variety of ways
119
and recognizes oral, as well as written, instructions. A legal frame-work
for decision making on behalf of patients who have not executed documents
or made their wishes known orally is provided; a hierarchal list, similar to
many existing states statutes, is provided but an orally designated surrogate
120
appears frrst in priority. Physicians are obligated to comply with patients'
advance directives unless they assert a conscience exception or the advance
121
directive requires medically ineffective health care.
.

.

IV. Institutionalization
A~

Damage Suits Against Nursing Homes
122

More than 1.7 million Americans reside in nursing homes. The quality
of the care they receive is the subject of extensive administrative regulation
114. The reported appellate decisions are: Schindler v. Schiavo, 78 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Pist. Ct.
App,. 2001); Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Schindler v.
Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); and Schindler v. Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
115. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426 (Va. 2000) (conflict between husband and
patient's brother; Governor of Virginia petitions court to continue nutrition and hydration); In
re Schmidt, 699 N.E.2d 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (conflict between husband and patient's siblings); Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (conservator may not withhold
artificial nutrition and hydration from a conscious but severely impaired patient absent clear and
convincing evidence the conservator's decision is in accordance with the patient's own wishes
or best interest).
116. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS Acr § 1-19, UNIF. L. ANN. (2001) (hereinafter UHCDA).
117. UHCDA § 5, 6.
118. UHCDA § 4.
119. ld. § 2(a).
120. UHCDA § 2.
121. /d. § 7(e)(t).
122. See, e.g., Paul Emrath, Seniors' Housing: Supply & Demand; HOUSING EcoN., April
1999, at 9.
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and enforcement, and private civil litigation. To operate, nursing homes
must be licensed by their states; almost all participate in the Medicare and
124
Medicaid programs. Whether administrative regulation is effective in
ensuring quality of care in these institutions is hotly debated. Despite
thousands of rules and survey inspections, conditions in many nursing
125
homes are deplorable.
The residential nature of nursing homes and the extraordinary levels of
disability of their populations combine to create great needs of highly vulnerable residents in institutional settings. In many instances, the placement
of an individual in a nursing home is functionally involuntary; no alternative
in the community exists. The public interest in the operation of this industry
is readily apparent. Aside from the vulnerability of the residents, in 1995
126
Medicare and Medicaid paid for 57% of all nursing-home care. With the
rapid increase in the number of the elderly, it is foreseeable that the number
of residents and the amount spent on long-tenn-care facilities will increase
127
dramatically over the coming decades. If the nursing home obtains payments from Medicare or Medicaid, it must also comply with federal regula128
tions. These regulations impose a minimum duty of care for the residents
129
and can be used as jury instructions to establish the duty of care.
Independent of administrative enforcement, civil litigation brought by,
or on behalf of, a resident against a nursing home has increased dramatically during the past two decades. The potential for this type of litigation
has always been present, but such suits were previously rare. Now they
130
Juries increasingly return large
have multiplied as have recoveries.
123. The HHS has identified nursing homes as an area "of great concern." DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET REQUEST: HEARING BEFORE TilE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ON LABOR, HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 107TH CONG. (2002) (testimony of Janet Rehnquist, Inspector General) available at 2002 WL 373620.
124. To participate, nursing homes must be certified by and must enter into provider agreements with the federal government. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, 101 STAT. 1330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396(r) (2000)).
125. In recent years, state surveys conducted in the nation's 17,000-plus nursing homes identified deficiencies that harmed residents or placed them at risk of death or serious injury in more
than one-fourth of nursing homes nationwide. See 1999 U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE,
NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL

QuALITY STANDARDS, GAO/HEHS-99-46 (Mar. 18, 1999).
126. See Katherine Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REv. 17 (1996).
127. See AHCA, Facts & Trends: The Nursing Facility Sourcebook 2001 vii, available at
http://www .ahca.org/research/nfs/nfs200 1-execsum.pdf.
128. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1- 483.480 (2001).
129. See Conservatorship of Gregory, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Ct. App. 2000).
130. The average award in nursing home negligence cases nearly doubled between 1987 and
1994, from $238,285 to $525,853. See Thomas D. Begley, Jr., Nursing Home Law and
Litigation, 156 N.J.L.J. 120 (1999).
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awards against the owners and operators of nursing homes. In 2000, the
top verdict against a nursing home was $20 million. In 2001, by contrast,
five verdicts were higher than that, including one for $312.7 million in
131
Texas. Punitive damages obviously increase the size of many of these
awards and are clustered in certain states, especially Florida, California,
132
Mississippi, and Texas.
These cases attract great public attention. The growing number of nursing--home cases reflects numerous factors statutory causes of action and
attorney fees in many states, a growing elderly population, and heightened
awareness of the plight of the elderly, particularly in institutional settings.
Many cases revolve around dramatic incidents a single error or omission
which produces grave injury or death. These often include patients who
are unsupervised, resulting in bums, drowning, suffocation, or strangulation.
In contrast, habitual neglect situations, e.g., malnutrition, dehydration, and
133
skin ulcers, reflect lack of care on an ongoing basis. When consulted on
these issues, the family law practitioner will have to decide whether to file
suit or refer the case to a more specialized tort or elder abuse litigator.
'

B. "Granny Cams" in Nursing Homes
134

Given the condition of many nursing homes and studies reporting large
35
and increasing amounts of elder abuse and neglect in these institutions, l
it is not surprising that many persons have advocated the deployment of
video cameras to protect residents. Proponents of taping argue many work136
places use cameras to record events. Videotaping can aid in prevention
137
and detection of elder abuse, a crime that is seriously underreported.
131. See NU Verdicts: 100 Top Verdicts of the Year, N.L.J. Litigation Services Network, Feb.
4, 2002, available at http://www.verdictsearch.com/news/specials/0204verdicts_charts.jsp.
132. /d.
133. See, e.g., Sauer v. Advocate, Inc., No. CfV 2000-5 (Ark. Cir. Ct. July 27, 2001) (awarding $78.43 million jury ·verdict against nursing home chain to family of ninety-three-year-old
Alzheimer's resident who died of dehydration at one of its facilities). See also Fuqua v.
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., No. 98-CV-1087 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2001) (awarding federal
jury verdict of $312.7 million to estate of nursing home resident who developed numerol.ls pressure sores and suffered from malnutrition at nursing home).
134. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
135. In a July 2001 report on nursing homes nationwide, the House Committee on Government
Refonn drew this conclusion:
Abuse of nursing home residents is a widespread and significant problem. In the last
two years, nearly one out of every three nursing homes in the United States has been
cited for violating federal standards established to prevent abuse. In over 1600 of the
nursing homes cited, the violations caused actual hann to residents or placed residents in immediate jeopardy of death or serious injury.
Tom Zucco, The Sleepless Eye, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at ID.
136. Notably banks, convenience stores, airports, and many others. ld.
137. A California legislative committee hearing recently noted that as much as 80% of all
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Moreover, only residents who request or consent to monitoring will have
such devices in their rooms.
Opponents of video cameras and other electronic monitoring in nursing
homes warn that., the presence of these devices will disturb the trusting
38
relationship between nursing staff and residents} Nursing home administrators claim neither residents nor employees want to be continuously
140
139
filmed. Insurers fear additional liability risks and lawsuits.
Lawyers are increasingly consulted about th·e legality and propriety of
taping. It is unclear whether legislation is needed to operate such cameras,
at least where the resident is not sharing a room with another person.
Texas recently passed a law requiring nursin_g homes and related facilities
141
to allow residents to install electronic monitoring devices in their rooms.
Though not the only state to consider such a measure, Texas is_the frrst to
enact one. The use of such cameras should be discussed with the nursing
home resident, the family, and the institution.
•

C. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims
Among the bodies of law the family practitioner must be conversant
142
with today is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This is par~
ticularly relevant to elderly clients, many of whom have disabilities. The
ADA has provided access for disabled persons to public accommodations
and opportunities for employment previously closed to them. The ability
to remain at home and not be inappropriately institutionalized in a nursing
home or other facility is appropriately framed as a civil rights issue~ The
ADA gives many opportunities for creative advocacy on behalf of clients.
143
The U.S. Supreme Court's Olmstead v. L.C. rei. Zimring decision held
that the ADA prohibits states' public programs from unnecessarily institutionalizing persons with disabilities. Among other things, Olmstead required
states to have a "comprehensive, effectively working plan" for placing
qualified individuals in less restrictive settings, and waiting lists that
144
move at a "reasonable pace . " States must assess whether persons have
been inappropriately placed in state institutions, nursing homes, and other
elder abuse goes unreported. See ELDER AND DEPENDENT ADULT ABUSE: TRAINING TO IDENTIFY
FINANCIAL ABUSE: HEARING ON A.B. 109 BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., CAL.
ASSEMBLY 109, 2001-2002 REG. SESS. (Cal. 2001).
138. See Charles H. Roadman II, Surveillance Cameras in Resident Rooms, AHCA NEws
RELEASE, (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://www.ahca.org/brief/080100.htm.
139. See Jessica Rappaport, Gtanny Cams' Under Surveillance, TECH TV (Apr. 15, 2002)
available at http://www ;techtv .com/news/culture/story/0,24195 ,33 79593 ,OO.htm.
140. See Roadman, supra note 138.
141. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.847(a) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2002).
142. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq~ (1995 &. West Supp. 2000).
143. 527 u.s. 581 ( 1999).
144. Jd. at 605-06.
4
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facilities. The Medicaid program is critical. Not only do these state programs
receive and provide major funding for both institutional and home and
community-based services, but also eligible individuals have a legal enti145
tlement to receive appropriate statutory services. States must administer
"services, programs and activities [e.g., Medicaid] in the most integrated
146
setting appropriate to the needs" of disabled persons. In addition, many
states make the "medically needy" individuals who fit into a federal benefit program category, such as the aged, blind, or disabled, ·b ut whose income
or resources are above the eligibility levels for the benefit program-eligible
147
for Medicaid. These persons can qualify if their income, minus incurred
148
medical expenses, is less than the state's income and resource levels.
Medicaid '·' waivers" allow states to avoid compliance with otherwise
applicable federal laws and to provide services to persons at home or in
149
the community, avoiding placement in a hospital or nursing home. To
this end, waivers can be used to provide services nortnally unavailable to
Medicaid beneficiaries, including case management, homemaker/home
health aides, personal care, adult day-care, health, habilitation and respite
care. 150 Medicaid waiver programs offer great opportunities, but many
problems need attention from family law practitioners. States have enjoyed
almost unchecked flexibility in how they administer their home and community-based services. In many states, for example, beneficiaries have
been placed on waiting lists, sometimes for years. These waiting lists violate
the statutory requirement that "assistance shall be furnished with reasonable
151
promptness to all eligible individuals." Another Medicaid requirement,
the "free choice" provision, provides that when a state covers both institutional and waiver program services, it must inform eligible individuals
about feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver. Individuals have
'

145. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (Supp. 2000).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794 as implemented by 28 C.P.R.§ 35.130(d) and§ 41.51(d).
147. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (Supp. 2000). The following jurisdictions have medically
needy programs: California, Connecticut~ District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vennont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginian, and Wisconsin.
148. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. 2000).
149. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c); 42 C.F.R. § 440.180 et seq. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396a(a)(21) ("[l]f the State plan includes medical assistance in behalf of individuals 65 years
of age or older who are patients in public institutions for mental diseases, [a State plan formedical assistance must] show that the State is making satisfactory pre>gress toward developing and
implementing a comprehensive mental health program, including provision for utilization of
community mental health centers, nursing facilities, and other alternatives to care in public
institutions for mental diseases").
150. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.180 (1999).
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (Supp. 2000). See also 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 ("agency must:
(a) furnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay caused by the agency's adminis-

236

Family Law Quarterly, Volume 38, Number 2, Summer 2004

the right to choose whether they will receive care under the waiver program
52
or in an institutional setting_l
Many states have failed to implement effectively their waiver programs,
chiefly because of cost concerns. This should be challenged. To receive
federal reimbursement, waiver services must be at least "cost neutral,"
i.e., the average per capita cost of home care may not exceed the average
153
per capita cost to Medicaid of institutional care. Moreover, the quality
of care and quality of life at home is likely to be better than in an institution.
Yet in fiscal year 2000, 73% of Medicaid's long-term care funds were
spent for institutionalized persons; only 27% went to provide services in
154
the community. Numerous suits have been brought to rectify this imbal155
ance; many more should be filed.

V. Grandparent-Grandchildren Relationships
A. The Role of Grandparents
Historically, the extended family has been common in American society
and grandparents have always played a prominent role. Today that role is
greater than ever. Based on current life expectancy, Americans can expect to
156
spend about half of their life in the role of grandparent. In single-parent
households, as well as in the increasingly two-job traditional two-parent
family, third persons are often aske,d to assist in everyday tasks of child
rearing and to assume a share of the financial, psychological, and emotional role of parents. Grandparents have always been, and are even more
so today, family members who meet these needs. Moreover, grandparents
are increasingly facing the challenge of raising their children's children.
Between 1990 and 2000 there was a 30% increase in children living in
grandparent-headed households from 3.5 million in 1990 to 4.5 million
157
in 2000. At least 1.5 million children now live in a household where
158
neither parent is present and the grandparent is the primary caregiver.
trative procedures; [and] (b) continue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals
until they are found to be ineligible . ~ .")/d. § 435.911 ("agency must establish time standards
for determining eligibility and infonn the applicant of what they are-").
152. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2) (Supp. 2000); 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(d) (1999).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 n(2)(D).
154. Fiscal Year 2002 Data, compiled by the MEDSTAT Group, available at http://www.
cms.gov/ (last visited March 17,-2004) ( '02 institutional expenditures, $57.41 billion; community expenditures, $24.72 billion).
155. See, e.g., Consent Decree, Flores, et al., v. Huphreys,. et al., Cause No. 49D02-0007CP0971 (entered Feb. 18, 2004) Marian Co. (lnd) Superior Ct.; see also, Clarence Sundstrom;
Strategies for Implementing Olmstead Directives. VICTIMIZATION OF ELDERLY AND DISABLED,
55-56 (Nov.-Dec. 2001) (discussing numerous cases).
156. Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparent's House We Go:
Or Do We, Post Troxel, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 751, 759 (2001).
157. ld.
158. Ken Bryson & Lynne M. Casper, Coresident Grandparents and Grandchildren, U.S ..
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Grandparents can be positive influences on grandchildren in many
159
ways. What matters to a child is the presence of a sensitive, loving adult
who provides the child with a sense of security, stability, and physical and
160
psychological well-being. Many experts believe the grandparent/grandchild relationship is uniquely significant to children, providing them with
161
emotional security and valuable role models. In addition to one-on-one
contact with the child, grandparents interact with and support the grand163
162
child's parents, transmit values, mediate between parents and children
164
and rescue families in trouble. Children often reside with or are taken
165
care of by grandparents after their parents divorce or separate.
Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p23-198.pdf. Press
Release, AARP, Grandparents Face Challenges Raising Grandchildren (New York) available
at, http://www .aarp.org/states/ny/Articles/a2003-06-24-ny-grandparents.html.
159. A recent AARP Grandparenting Survey (The AARP Grandparenting Survey: The sharing
and caring between mature grandparents and their grandchildren) explored many facets of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship including communications, grandparent roles, activities,
spending patterns, relationships, and values. AARP conducted a national survey of 823 grandparents age fifty and older found that 82% of grandparents had seen a grandchild in the past month,
85% had talked to a grandchild on the telephone, and 53% had sent a grandchild a greeting card.
Also within the last month, about seven in ten had shared a meal with a grandchild, half had
watched a television comedy or had their grandchild spend the night, and about four in ten shopped
for clothes, took part in exercise or sports, watched educational television, attended a religious service, or watched a video. Fifty percent of grandparents say they frequently play the role of friend or
companion for a grandchild. When asked to rate their relationship with one grandchild, chosen randomly by the computer, grandparents gave an average rating of 8.7 on a 10-point scale. AARP
Grandparenting Survey, available at http://research.aarp.org/genera1/grandpsurv .html.
160. Shelley A. Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville: Implications of Attachment theory for
Judicial Decisions Regarding Custody and Third-Party Visitation , 41 FAM. CT. REv. 39,45 (2003).
161. ARTHUR KORNHABER & KENNETII L. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS/GRANDCHILDREN: THE
VITAL CoNNECI"ION 55 (1981). One psychological study, which focused specifically on the ties
between grandparent and grandchild, found that grandchildren who maintained close contact
with their grandparents were more at ease with the elderly, generally more emotionally secure,
and less likely to be abused or become dependent on drugs. See Rebecca Brown, Comment,
Grandparent Visitation and the Intact Family, 16 S. IlL U. L.J. 133, 133 (1991). Vincent K.
Adkins, Grandparents as a National Asset: A Brief Note, 24(1) ACTIVITIES, ADAPTATION &
AGING, 13-18 (1999).
162. Riggs , supra note 160, at 45.
163. Values grandparents say they most want to pass on to their grandchildren are morals or
integrity (42o/o), success or ambition (21% ), or religion (20%). Riggs, supra note 160, at 45.
164. Marrus, supra note 156, at 758. This article lists some of the values present in the grandchild/grandparent relationship as:
Transmission of values from one generation to another; . . . serving as arbitrators
between parents and children concerning values that are central to family continuity
and individual enhancement. ... [G]randchildren... perceive their grandparents as influential in their value development. Furthennore, studies have shown that grandparents
can have "as much (if not more) influence upon the developing child as the child's own
parents." The mediating role that grandparents, particularly grandmothers, often take
on between the mother and child can indeed improve the mother/child relationship./d.
165. Riggs, supra note 160, at 45. More than one third of parents and three quarters of their
children will likely reside in a grandparent's home during or after a divorce./d.
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B. Visitation
Under common law doctrine, parents detennined whether grandparents
(or others) could have a relationship with their children. Unfettered parental
autonomy in these matters was based on the idea that parents ordinarily
166
act in the child's best interest. That power was bolstered by a long
series of Supreme Court decisions recognizing a parent's right to direct
the upbringing of his or her child as a fundamental liberty interest under
167
the Fourteenth Amendment. Responding to rising divorce rates and
other dramatic changes in American family life, all states passed statutes
in the 1960s and 1970s recognizing the rights of third parties especially
grandparents to participate in children's lives. These statutes typically
named specific classes of individuals who may petition a court to detetmine
168
if visitation is in the child's best interest. Although there were contrary
169
decisions, most state courts upheld the constitutionality of these third170
party-visitation statutes against challenges by parents.
The United States Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Troxel v.
111
Granville reversed this trend, but its implications remain cloudy. Nine
Supreme Court Justices wrote six opinions, appearing as divided as the
family that litigated the case. The plurality opinion found the challenged
Washington visitation statute "breathtakingly broad" and failed to accord
172
deference to the parent's constitutionally protected autonomy:
The decision whether . . . an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in
any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent's
decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the Court must
accord at least some special weight to the parent's own detennination. 173
166. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (Child's "interest is inextricably
linked with the parents' interest").
167. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating "[i]t is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom includes preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"); Wis.
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (explaining that "the primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition" ); H. L. v. Mathieson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) ("[W]e have recognized that parents have
a "guiding role" to play in the upbringing of their children, which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions") (citation omitted).
168. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1993) (grandparents who can demonstrate ''substantial relationship with grandchildren"); Mo. ConE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999); GA.
CoDE ANN.§ 19-7-3 (c) (West 1999) (visitation to be granted if in "best interests of child").
169. See , e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
170. The "vast majority of courts that have addressed the constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes authorizing visitation if in the best interest of the child have upheld those statutes
as constitutional." Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 644 n18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing
cases). See also, e.g. , King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) cert. denied 506 U.S. 941 (1992).
171. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
172. /d. at 69-70.
173. /d. at 70.
•

Representing Elders in the Family Law Practice

239

The "special weight" to be given a parent's decision-making in future
cases was, probably purposely, left ambiguous in the plurality's "as
applied" constitutional analysis. The checkered pattern of subsequent
cases challenging existing state visitation statutes attests to the lack of
74
consensus by state courts regarding the precise meaning of Troxe/}
Some state appellate courts have found existing state statutes facially
unconstitutional when no question was raised about the fitness of the par176
ent.175 Others, taking Justice O'Connor's suggestion, have essentially
rewritten grandparent visitation statutes to include more rigorous requirements before a trial court could overrule a parent's right to decide visitation
177
issues. In other states, legislatures have redrafted their statutes to nar178
row the opportunity for courts to order visitation.
Yet grandparents with significant relationships with grandchildren are not
without hope. Maintaining that relationship which is separate and distinct
179
180
is often in a grandchild's best interests.
from that of parents and child
Som_e recent decisions have acknowledged a child's right to continue such
relationships. A New York family court observed:
174. See Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the
Court's Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT
REv. 14-38 (2003) (analyzing ten cases decided by state supreme courts in eight states since the
Troxel decision. Three state courts declared grandparent visitation statutes unconstitutional as
applied. One decision found the statute unconstitutional on its face, three found their state
statutes facially constitutional, and one reached the same result regarding a visitation statute that
applied only in cases of divorce).
175. See, e.g., Wicham v. Bern, 769 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002); Linderv. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841 (Ark.
2002) (mother's unfitness to decide grandparent visitation did not equate to unfitness to parent).
176. Troxel, supra note 171, at 72-73.
177. See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002) (party seeking visitation must
establish parent-like relationship and show denial of visitation would cause harm to child contemplated by neglect/dependency statutes).
178. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CooE § 14-09-05.1 (2002) (specific finding needed that visitation
will not interfere with parent-child relationship, and removing presumption that grandparent
visitation is in the best interest of the child); OR. REv. STAT. § I09.119 (2001) (petitioner must
overcome presumption that legal parent acts in best interest in the child by clear and convincing evidence); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 36-6-306 (2001) (finding of danger of substantial harm to
child needed before hearing required on petition for visitation).
179. See Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (N.J. 1975) ("[v]isits with a grandparent are
often a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any other relationship"). See also ARTHUR KORNHABER & SONDRA FORSYTH, GRANDPARENT POWER (1994);
Christine Davik-Galbraith, Note, "Grandma, Grandpa, Where Are You?"- Putting the Foct,ts of
Grandparent Visitation Statutes on the Best Interests of the Child, 3 ELDER L.J. 143 ( 1995).
180. Dr. Arthur Kornhaber has noted that the consequences of denying a grandchild a relationship with their grandparents is "[t]o deny children access to their heritage and to prevent
them from carrying that legacy into the future is a grave error which inflicts profound psychological wounds on all concerned." Nicole E. Miller, The Best Interests of All Children: An
Examination of Grandparent Visitation Rights Regarding Children Born Out of Wedlock, 42
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 179, 191-92 (1998) (quoting KORNHABER & FORSYTH, supra note 179).
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This Court views the New York Legislature, and many of the comments in
Troxel, as telling parents and grandparents alike that, given the apparent disappearance of the traditional family, children's best interests require the opportunity for participation by siblings and grandparents to be sure that the moral
obligations of familial relationships are carried out. What used to be known as
the common law is not so common any more. Non-biologic care givers are
assuming previous strictly parental roles more and more frequently. 181

In another case, the court noted:
The historical development of family law in America, and the expansion of
individual constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, give foundation to a holding
that a child has a constitutional right to maintain contact with a person with
whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship. Accompanying that
right, is also a right to the equal protection of the laws. This requires that the
child have the due process necessary to claim his right. This claim can be given
constitutional protection, while at the same time giving due recognition, respect
and protection to a parent's constitutional right to the custody, care and control
of his or her child. 182

On a more basic level, lawsuits between grandparents and parents
regarding visitation obviously reflect enorrnous tension and conflict within
these families. The adversarial nature of these cases, and the generally
winner-take-all result, should lead family lawyers to consider their role
thoughtfully in these situations. This type of litigation may well produce
serious harm for the child. Additionally, the very length of these cases is
often an additional detriment. The bitter dispute in Troxel between the
mother and the grandparents regarding visitation with the daughters of the
deceased husband proceeded through the trial court twice and through
three levels of appellate review. The litigation lasted seven years. And in
another high-profile grandparent parent case, the O.J. Simpson contest
took more than five years of trial and appellate review and ended only
183
after a negotiated settlement.
What can we deduce from these examples? Troxel resembles "high
conflict" child custody and visitation contests between divorcing parents,
181. Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S. 2d 503,507 (Fam. Ct., 2000). See also In re Paternity
of Roger D.H., 641 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Giljour v. Harris, 795 So. 2d 350, 358
(La. App. Ct. 2001).
182. Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 341 (Fam. Ct. 2001).
183. The Browns appealed and won a reversal and remand based on procedural and evidentiary errors by the trial court. Guardianship of Sydney Simpson, et al., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389
(App. Ct. 1998). Before a second custody trial, the parties negotiated a settlement, essentially
reiterating the initial trial court decision. Juditha Brown was prompted to drop the custody fight
at the urging of the children, who asked her to let them stay with their father. Hector Becerra,
Simpson's Former In-Laws Agree to Let Children Stay With Him Settlement, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at B3.
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generally agreed by family lawyers and judges to be damaging to all con184
cerned. The contentiousness between parents ending their relationship
is often present in grandparent visitation disputes. The parent may be
motivated not by the child's best interest but by hostility to the family of
the estranged partner or spouse. The characters in these human dramas
find their lives probed by partisan experts; old incidents and wounds are
revisited by opposing counsel in the courtroom, in pleadings, and in depositions. These lawsuits exact an enormous toll upon all participants. In a
grandparent p-arent visitation case, a New York court observed that the
case presented a ''tragedy in human interpersonal relationships which is
185
basically beyond purview of the law." Another court examining extended
litigation over grandparent visitation commented:
We can only wonder how courts are to detennine when visitation has been
unreasonably denied where, as here, a parent and adult child have become so
estranged that they can not communicate and act only to hurt one another. We can
only wonder what business courts have getting into such intra-family disputes. 186
'

Mediation or other less fonnal means of dispute resolution may well be
better alternatives. A trained mediator encourages the parties to listen to
one another, communicate their needs, and to explore alternatives and
accommodations to reach a consensual decision on issues relating to children. Cooperation and compromise may resolve some or all of the issues
that separate the parties, or at least narrow the gap so that attorneys may
187
negotiate a settlement of the remaining issues. Results of these processes
include higher settlement rates and reduced court congestion, which
188
enable courts to spend greater time on remaining cases.
184. "Amidst all this potential conflict there is a child. There can be no doubt that children
survive divorce, and sometimes they do remarkably well. Yet, at the very least the parent's
divorce is a trying time for the child, and at most it can cause life-long trauma." PETER N.
SWISHER, H. ANTHONY MILLER & lANA B. SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1093 (2d ed. 1998); "When a custody dispute goes to court, it is often bitterly fought.
In the midst of the battling over their own rights, it is easy for parents to lose track of their children's needs and interests." HARRY D. KRAusE, LINDA D. ELROD, ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QuESTIONS 629 (4th ed. 1998).
185. Doe v. Smith, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624,627 (1993).
186. Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d 479, 482 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
187. Linda Silbennan & Andrew Schepard, Consultants Comments on the New York State
Law Revision Recommendation on the Child Custody Dispute Resolution Process, 19 CoLo.
J~L. AND

Soc. PRoss. 399, 407 (1985).
188. Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 CoLo. J.L. AND Soc. PRoss. 413,
423 (1985). (Jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, that require mediation report settlement rates
as high as 90%; 86% settlement rate in Dade County, Florida, and more than 54% in Los
Angeles County). Thirty-three states have statutes or court rules that mandate mediation in contested custody and visitation cases. Peter Salem & Ann L. Milne, Making Mediation Work in a
Domestic Violence Case, 17 FAM. Aovoc. 34 (1995).
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VI. Elder Abuse & Neglect
Elder abuse and neglect is surely an unpleasant topic-, but one that must
be confronted by family law practitioners. Although no frrm data on the
actual amount of mistreatment exists, the number of elderly adults abused
189
each year is believed to be between 1.5 and 2 million. Only one in eight
cases is actually reported to authorities; much mistreatment occurs within
the family, and the elderly person is often simultaneously embarrassed by
the abuse, fearful of future mistreatment and, paradoxically, protective of
190
the abuser. This "hidden problem'' often affects persons with limited
191
contact with outsiders.
Elder maltreatment often has a devastating impact on victims. Because
of their age, health, or limited resources, victims typically have few
options for resolving or avoiding abusive situations. Their physical frailty
makes them more vulnerable to physical or other abuse, and poor health
192
often accentuates the problem. Older persons may be less able to recover
from financial exploitation because of fixed incomes or a short remaining
life span. The loss of a home lived in for many years ·m ay be particularly
traumatic because of its familiarity, memories, and the trauma of being
moved. It is no surprise that abuse and neglect correlate with a higher
death rate. Studies have shown mistreated elders are 3.1 times more like193
ly to die than their nonmistreated counterparts. Elder abuse and neglect
is as dangerous to the health and well-being of older adults as many
194
chronic diseases associated with death and disability.
Although there are many different statutory and judicial definitions of
189.

SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH

& LONG-TERM

CARE OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING,

10lST CONG., ELDER ABUSE: A DECADE OF SHAME AND lNACI'lON, XI (Comm. Print 1990) [here-

inafter 1990 ELDER ABUSE HousE REPORT] (estimating more than 1.5 million persons may be
victims of such abuse each year and the number is rising). See 1990 National Center on Elder
Abuse, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, pt. 5, Conclusions, available at http://www.
aoa.gov/abuse/report/H-Conclusions.htrill (hereinafter NEAIS). See-also Karl Pillemer & David
Moore, Highlights from a Study of Abuse of Patients in Nursing Homes, 2 J. ELDER ABUSE &
NEGLEcr 5, 18-19 (1990) (finding 36% of all nursing home personnel reported seeing at least
one_incident of physical abuse by staff members; 40% admitted committing psychological
abuse in the past year).
190. See, e.g., Jordan Kosberg & Daphne Nahmiash, Characteristics of Victims and
Perpetrators and Milieus of Abuse and Neglect; in ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION OF
OLDER PERSONS: STRATEGIES FOR Ass·ESSMENT & INTERVENTION 31 (L. Baumhover and S.C.
Beall eds., 1996).
191. /d.at32.
192. Although it would be inaccurate to describe the vast population ·over sixty-five with one
generalization, physical decline eventually becomes an aspect of the aging process. See generally D. TOMB, GROWING OLD 15-40 (1984). Chronic health problems increase dramatically in
this age group. R. ATCHLEY, SOCIAL FORCE & AGING 91 ( 1988).
193. See MarkS. Lachs et al., The Mortality of Elder Mistreatment, 280 JAMA 428 (1998).
194. See id.
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financial abuse,-it generally consists of the illegal or improper use of an
elder's assets, e.g., theft, fraud, and breach of fiduciary or caregiver duty.
195
A.t most, only one out of every five financial abuse cases is reported.
Though the reasons for financial abuse may vary, the fact that persons
over the age of fifty-five control at least 70% of the nation's household net
196
worth reflects its target. There is also an important gender issue. Many
older women have never handled their own financial affairs, depending on
their husband for that function. While learning to manage their resources,
they are often an inviting target.
Lawyers are in a strategic position to identify and repair financial
abuse, especially by family members. At least five states require attorneys
197
to report any reasonable belief that financial abuse has occurred.
Lawyers often draft ,durable powers of attorney and create and administer
198
guardianships, trusts,· and other instruments-. As a result, attorneys are
often in a position to warn clients about the possibility, or actual misuse,
of these legal devices. Warning signs of financial exploitation include:
dramatic changes in withdrawal patterns; unusual checks written to cash;
signatures that do not appear genuine; a decrease in a senior's s,pending;
unpaid bills after a long history of prompt payment.

VII. Ethical Issues in Representing the Elder·ly
A. Identifying the Client
Often the lawyer is contacted not by the older person, but by a, son,
daughter or other relative. These family members are frequently involved
in advising, assisting, and even directing financial and practical arrange195. NEAIS, supra note 189, at 4.
196. Kemper Funds Study Reveals Investors over Age 55 Control Nation's Wealth,-SENIOR
JouRNAL. COM, June 26, 2000 available at http://www.seniorjoumal.com/NEWS/2000%20Files/
June%2000/FI'R-6-26- OOSnrsCntrlWlth.htm~
197. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 46-454(B) (West 2000) (attorneys in some roles have a duty to
report); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 52-3- 811(3)(t) {2000); NEv. REv. STAT.§ 200.5093 (1999); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN.§ 5101.61A (Anderson 2000); TEX. HuM. RES. CoDE ANN.§ 48.051 {Vernon
2000). See also DEL. CooE ANN. TIT. 31, § 3910 (1999) (requiring any person with a reasonable
belief that abuse is occurring to report); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 415.1034(1) (West 2000) (requiring
any person having knowledge of abuse to report); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(2) (Michie
2000) (requiring any person having reasonable cause to suspect abuse to report); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 16l-F:46 (1999) (requiring any person suspecting or believing abuse has occurred or is
occurring to report); ·N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27- 7-30 (Michie 2000) (requiring any person having
reasonable cause to believe abuse is occurring to report); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 43A, § 10-104
(West 2000) (requiring any person with reasonable cause to believe abuse is occurring to report).
198. One- of the issues that a principal should consider when executing a financial durable
power is whether to include a power to make gifts. This type of power is frequently granted in
financial durable powers of attorney. The grant of such a power should be made with great caution. See generally Hans A. Lapping, Note, License to Steal: Implied Gift-Giving Authority and
Powers _o f Attorney, 4 ELDER L.J. 143 ( 1996).
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ments for care of the aged relative. The elderly person may not even be
present at the interview. If present, the elderly person typically is accompanied by one or more younger family members who provides the documentation or infortnation the attorney needs about the senior citizen or his
199
property.
Bankbooks, mortgage documents, financial statements, tax
returns, etc., may well be under the control of the relative. There may, of
course, be a conflict of interest between the child and the parent, and if it
is evident initially, the attorney must quickly decide who the client is and
explain completely and openly to other family members the limitations
this will impose. A written retainer agreement may be a practical way of
clarifying the client's identity or a letter to other family members clearly
stating that the lawyer is not representing them.
An attorney has the duty to maintain complete confidentiality regarding
200
ahnost all client disclosures. When the client is the senior, he or she should
be inforrned that confidentiality is waived if a child or another family
member is present during the interview, reads mail from or to the attorney,
or is invited to participate in other ways. Asking the accompanying family
member to wait in another room while the attorney meets privately with
the senior client may immediately produce an awkward situation for those
not familiar with attorney-client privilege.

B. Joint Representation
As an alternate solution, the lawyer may be asked to represent multiple
clients, including the aged person, who have "sought the services of one
lawyer to help them resolve differences or execute a transaction between
or among themselves. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the
parties share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but common representation
201
may be inferred from other circumstances." When the lawyer acts as an
interrnediary, he or she must obtain inforn1ed consent from each client
after having explained the advantages and disadvantages of common representation. That may be difficult with an aged, dependent family member.
Independent of that consent, the lawyer must reasonably believe that
the matter can be resolved on tern1s compatible with clients' best interests,
that each client is competent to make informed decisions in the matter,
and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of
202
the clients. While acting as an inter1nediary, the lawyer must be impartial
199. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON McCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 60 (2d ed. 1999).
200. MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998) (hereinafter, MODEL RULES).
201. MoDEL RULES R. 2.2. The comment states that "a lawyer acts as intennediary under this
rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially conflicting interest."
202. E.g ., can the attorney fulfill his or her obligation to each individual including loyalty
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as to the competing interests of the individual clients. If there is any conflict
in this intergenerational representation, the attorney must make a choice
of whom to represent and infortn all parties. This often will be difficult for
an attorney contemplating future legal work as ex,e cutor or attorney for the
estate or future representation of younger family members. All rights to
confidentiality and attorney/client privilege must be waived as between
the clients involved in the intermediation, although commentary to Rule
203
2.2 suggests that it may be possible to preserve some limited rights.

C. Payment of Fees
If the family member, typically a child, is paying the parent's attorney
204

fees, that infortnation must be disclosed and appropriate consent obtained.
The assets of many aged persons e.g., retirement accounts or equity in a
mortgaged home-· ~are often unavailable quickly or without substantial
changes in personal and living arrangements. The duty of loyalty is impaired,
however, if the attorney gives priority to another's interests, such as those
of the payer of the fee, thus rendering the lawyer unable to advocate effectively for the client.

D. Capacity
A particularly sensitive matter in dealing with elderly clients is assessment of the capacity of the elderly relative to make decisions. Often a
decision about whether to seek guardianship may be the triggering event
that brings the family member, and perhaps the elderly parent, to the
lawyer's office. Determining the degree of mental impair1nent that must be
present to predict an individual's need for assistance is difficult for most
205
lawyers. Legal capacity varies according to the decision to be made.
(i.e., avoiding conflicts of interest (MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES R. 1. 7); cOmpetency and diligence (MODEL CODE
Canon 6 ( 1980); MODEL RULES R. 1.1 ); zealous advocacy (MODEL CODE EC 7 ( 1980); MODEL
RULES R. 1.1 & 1.2). Is communication sufficient to enable the client to make infonned decisions about the representation? MODEL CoDE EC 7-8 (1980); MODEL RULES R. 1.4.
203. The comment to Rule 2.2 provides: A particularly important factor in detennining the

appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorneyclient privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each client
adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of infonnation related to the representation.
See MODEL RULES R. 1.4 and 1.6 (1998). ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES§
4:36 (1993).
204. A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the
client." MODEL RULES R. 1.7. See also MODEL RULES R. 1.8(f)(l).

205. The following standard was proposed by THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTHCARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATION OF INFORMED CONSENT IN 'ffiE
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VIII. Conclusion
Family law practice and the elderly intersect at many points. The topics discussed in this essay are by no means exhaustive; numerous other
issues could have been analyzed. The legal needs of the elderly implicate
numerous bodies of substantive and procedural law. Even mundane dayto-day matters such as the older person's driving privileges present legal
and interpersonal challenges.
Effective lawyers seek to maximize the probability of achieving client
objectives while minimizing legal risks and costs. In representing elderly
persons, traditional lawyering skills interviewing, counseling, planning,
drafting, etc. are critical. Even the best planning and implementation
often will require monitoring and alteration as circumstances change. Our
challenge as family law practitioners is to grow in skill and knowledge to
meet the needs of our older clients and their families.

57-62 (1982):
Decision making capacity requires, to a lesser or greater degree: (1) possession of a set
of values and goals; (2) the ability to communicate and to understand infonnation; and
(3) the ability to reason and to deliberate about one's choices. An emotional state consistent with the task also is required.
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